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Grand Jury the previous year and been
discharged in January 1950 without disclosing the fact. Without participation in
the verdict no prejudice resulted.
In People v. Yeaget, 194 Cal. 45Z, 48148Z, ZZ9 P. 4O,it was stated that a court
may not be required to grant a motion for
change of venue because .,there was some
excitement in the county regarding the mat~
ter, or that the press had expressed hostility; and that a denial qf a :change of venue
might well be predicated on the fact that
the excitement had subsided before the application was made. In that case a mU4;:h
shorter period had int~rvened between the
events and the trial. In People v. Wallace, 6 Cal.zd 759, 59 P.Zd 115, the chief
of police of North Sacramento was the
victim. The denial of the motion and the
renewed motion and the challenge to the
jury panel was based upon the trial court's
fair appraisal of the jury selected about
five weeks after the 'homicide occurred.
As declated in those cases the matters were
addressed to the soun~ discretion of the
trial court. Here there is no justification
for a conc1u9ion that the court committed
an abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue or in disallow..
ing the challenge to the jury panel.
The record discloses that the defendant
had a fair and impartial trial and that the
evidence fully supports the verdicts of the
jury.

87 Ca1.2d 499
LEE ON at al. Y. LONG .t al.
S. F. 18026.

Supreme Court of CalJfornin, In Bank.
June 29, 1951.
Rehearing Denied July 26, 1051.

Lee On and others brought action against
James Long, indIviduallY and as sheriff, etc.,
and others to recover money seized from
gambling tables, by the named defendant In
a gambling raid. The action was consolidated for trial with n petition filed by the Coun-

of Contra Costa tor an order authorizing
forfeitUre of tbe money to the county. The
Superior Court of Contra Costa County,
Homer W. Patterson, J., entered an order
denying the county's prayer for forfeiture
of the money and denied plaintiffs recovery,
and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme
Court, Spence, J., held that courts would not
lend assista~ce to plaintiffs whose claim tor
relief rests on an illegal transaction.
ty

Affirmed.

Carter, Shauer, and Traynor, JJ.; dissen ted.
Prior opinion, 223 P.2d 894.

I. Action c$;:I4
Where sheriff and deputies on gambling raid SeIZed gambling paraphernalia
and money from gambling tables, and the
money was deposited with county treasurer, and owners of gambling paraphernalia
and money pleaded guilty to gambling
charges and were fined, court would not
The judgment is affirmed.
lend assistance to owners of the money in
suit against the sheriff and others to reGIBSON, C. ]., and EDMONDS, cover the money, since the. owners claim
TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, and SPENCE, for - relief rested on illegal transaction.
JJ., concur.
Pen. Code, § 330.

CARTER, Justice.
I dissent.
In my opinion the ~vidence· was insufficient to estabHsh the corpus: delicti,
and the trial court committed prejudicial
error in stating in the presence 'of the
jury that the corpus delicti had been established.
I would,_ therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the ca5e for a new trial.
Rehearing denied; CARTER, J., dissenting.
234

P.2d-l~

2. Gaming *='58
Where sheriff and deputies on gam-

bling raid seized gambling paraphernalia
and money from gambling tables, and the
money was deposited with county treasurer, and ownerS of gambling paraphernalia
and money pleaded guilty to gambling
charges and were ,fined, county was not
entitled to have the money forfeited to
county, notwithstanding that owners of
money could not prevail in suit to recover
the money. Pen. Code, § 330; Government Code, § Z9704.

10
3. C••tracts $=0138(1)
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Louis De Matteis, Dist. Atty. (San Mat<o).
A party to an illegal contract cannot and N. J. Menard, Dis~ Atty. (Santa Clara),
COme into court of law and ask to have as amici curiae on ·behalf of respondents.
his illegal objects carried out, nor can he
set up a case in which he must necessarily
SPENCE, Justice.
disclose an illegal purpose as the ground[I] The question to be determined is
work of his claim.
whether the trial court erred in its judgment denying plaintiffs the right to recover
4. Contracts <!P 138(7)
Rule that a party to an illegal con- money seized while in use in gambling
tract cannot come into a court of law to games, which games were being conducted
have the contract enforced, is not limited in violation of law. Consistent with the
in its application to parties to the illegal settled principle that the courts will not
transaction, as distinguished from an at- lend assistance to persons whose claim for
tempt to set up a claim against a third relief rests on an illegal transaction, it is
our conclusion that plaintiffs cannot preparty, based on the law's violation.
vail.
5. Contracts <!P138(1)
In AUg'.lst, 1945, plaintiffs were arrested
The test of the application of the rule
in a gambling raid made on certain premthat a party to an illegal contract cannot
ises in El Cerrito. Thereafter plaintiffs
come into court of law and ask to have
were charged with the violation of section
the illegal contract enforced, is whether the
330 of the Penal Code (gaming); and upon
plaintiff can establish his case otherwise
arraignment, they pleaded guilty to the
than through the medium of an illegal
charges and paid the fines imposed.
transaction to which he himself is a party.
In the course of the raid, t-he sheriff
6. Action $=04
and his deputies seized from the tables at
If plaintiff cannot open his case, based which plaintiffs were seated certain dice,
on an illegal transaction, without showing dominoes, playing cards, lottery tickets, and
that he has broken the law, the court will money in the amount of $6,248.35. The
not assist him, whatever his claim in jus- county of Contra Costa -filed a petition in
,tice may be on the defendant.
the superior court praying for an order authorizing
destruction of the gambling
7. Trover and conversion e=a16
paraphernalia
and forfeiture of the money.
In an action for conversion, the plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the strength Plaintiffs in tum brought suit against the
of his own title and not on the weakness sheriff, Long, and the district attorney,
Collins, for the return of the money. The
of the title of his adversary.
two cases were tried upon the same evidence. The court ordered confiscation of
the gambling paraphernalia but with reDeasy & Dodge and Philip L. Evans,
spect to the money, it denied both the
Oakland, for appellants.
county's petition for forfeiture and also
Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Clarence plaintiffs' prayer for its return.
A. Linn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Francis W.
In the disposition of plaintiffs' action,
Collins, Dist. Atty. (Contra Costa), and the trial court found, in accord with the
Thomas F. McBride, Deputy Dist. Atty., undisputed testimony of the sheriff, deMartinez, for respondents.
fendant Long, that the money was seized
J. F. Coakley, Dis!. Atty. (Alameda), R. from gambling tahles. wher:e it was uin use
Robert Hunter, Ass!. Dist. Atty., Richard in gambling games"; that plaintiffs had
H. KUppert, Deputy Dis!. Atty., William E. pleaded guilty to the violation of section
Simpson, Dist. Atty. (Los Angeles), J. 330 of the Penal Code and each had paid a
Francis O'Shea, Dist. Atty. (Sacramento), fine of $250; that the money had been
J. D. Keller, Dist. Atty. (San Diego), Thom- deposited by defendant Long with the
a. C. Lynch, Dis!. Atty. (San Francisco), county treasurer, and that plaintiffs had
Chester Watson, Dis!. Atty. (San Joaquin), failed to file a claim "against defendants
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in their official capacity
pursuant to the requirements of Section 29704
of the Government Code." Upon these
findings, the eourt concluded that plain-

question of whether plaintiffs, admittedly
engaged in illegal gambling activities at
the time-of the raid and their arrest, are
in a position to assert their ownership and

tiffs' claim was barred "by their failure right to possession of the money that was
to comply with said sectio~, 29704; that then in actual use. in such activities, and

the money "at the time of' [its] seizure" to enlist the aid of the court in seeking to
was being "used in violatibn of the [state] have it restored to them.
gaming laws"; and that' -"the law will not
[H] "No principle of law is better

lend its support to a claim founded on its
own violation." From the 'adverse judg~
ment accordingly entered, plaintiffs have
appealed.
[2] The principal question on this appe3J, the answer to which, -appears to be
determinative, is whether plaintiffs, despite
their c1aim of ownership and right to possession of the money in question, are nevertheless barred from its, recovery by the
trial court's lfindings that: the money was
"at the time of its seizure in use in gambling games," which games were being
conducted in violation Qf law. Plaintiffs
do not contest the propri~ty of these findings, but they argue that the trial court's
refusal to return the money to them is
contrary to the statutory provisions limiting the scope of forfeitures. To this point,
plaintiffs cite section 2604 of the Penal
Code, declaring that "No conviction of any
person for a crime works: any forfeiture
of any property, except in cases in which
a forfeiture is expressly ir;nposed by law".
The Legislature has pr6vided in two instances for the forfeiture of money used in
gambling, neither of which is applicable
here: Penal Code, § 335a, having to do
with gambling devices other than those
here involved; and section 325, dealing
with lottery activities, as to which the
seized money was in nowise connected
under the evidence or the court's 'findings.
Consistent with the general rule governing
the construction of statutes involving forfeitures (12 CaI.Jur. § 3, pp. 633-634), the
trial court properly recognized the limits of
its "express statutory authority and denied
the county's petition for forfeiture "as far
as the money [was] concerned." Cf. Chapman v. Aggeler, 47 Cal.App.2d 848,
860-il61, 119 P.2d 204. However, the present case on appeal does not concern the
law of forfeitures, but rather relates to the

settled than that a party to an illegal COl>tract cannot come into a court of law and
ask to have his illegal objects carried out;
nor can he set up a ease in which he must
necessarily disclose an illegal purpose -as
the groundwork of his claim." 17 C.J.S.,
Contracts, § 272, p. 656.
NQr is this established rule limited in
its application to parties to the inega1
transaction as distinguished from an attempt to set up a claim against a third
party based on the law's violation. Schur
v. Johnson, 2 Cal.App.2d 680, 683, 38 P.2d
844; Asher v. Johnson, 26 Ca1.App.2d 403,
413,79 P.2d 457. A.was said in the Schur
case, 2 Cal.App.2d at pages 68~84, 38
P.2d at page 846, "'the test of its [the
rule's] application is whether the plaintiff
can estaJblish his case otherwise than
through the medium of an illegal transaction to which he himself is a party.'''
Likewise illustrative of the courts' attitude
towards the enforcement of a demand
"connected with an illegal transaction" is
the statement in the Asher case, 26 Cal.
App.2d at page 416, 79 P.2d at page 464:
If'If the plaintiff cannot open his case
without showing that he has broken the
law, the court will not assist him, whatever his claim in justice may be upon the
defendant.''' In such cases, the illegal
nature of the transaction creates a udis_
ability in [the] plaintiff." 17 c.J.S. Contracts, § 272, p. 659.
Here it is manifest that plaintiffs could
not, and did not prove their right to po,session of the seized money without disclosing that it was in use in their iIIegaJ
gambling activities at the time of the raid
and their arrest in the gambling estabJishment. Moreover, plaintiffs pleaded guilty
to the violation of the gaming law a,
charged fol1owing their arrest and paid
the ,fines imposed. Shall the courts then

12

Cal

23' PACIFIO Jl.EPORTRR, 2d BRRIES

lend their aid to enable persons such as
plaintiffs, whO' have committed a criminal
offense, to recover the money which was
in actual use in the perpetration thereof?
Such question must be answered in the
negative under the principles enunciated
in Schur v. Johnson, supra, 2 Ca1.App.2d
680, 38 P.2d 844, and Asher v. Johnson,
supra, 26 CaI.App.2d 403, 79 P.2d 457,
where the operators of illegal tango es~
tablishments sought to' recover sales taxes
which they paid to the state under protest
that such levies had been improperly made
on their gambling games. In the last cited
cases, plaintiffs were denied recovery on
. the ground that they had to rely on their
unlawful business to' establish their right
to recover the money wrongfully collected.

In so holding, the court in the Asher case
pertinently said, 26 Cal.App.2d at page 408,
79 P.2d at page 460: "We cauuot afford to
temporize on principles which vitally affect
the public welfare." As involving fundamentally similar legal considerations, the
court there cited and quoted at length
26 Cal.App.2d 41(}.411, 79 P.2d 457, from
the leading case of Dorrell v. Clark, 90
Mont 585, 4 P.2d 712, 79 A.LR 1000,
holding that the owner o,r possessor of a
slot machine, which is lawfully seized by
a ~heriff or a police officer, is not entitled
to the return of the money found therein.
''(he same general reasoning has been fol','Owed by courts in other jUJfisdictions in
refusing to restore to alleged owners money
earmarked or segregated as part of gambling operations and lawfully seized along
with gambling paraphernalia in the COurse
of a gambling raid. Hofferman v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449, 49 N.E.2d 523, 527;
Germania Club v. City of Chicago. 332 Ill.
App. 112, 74 N.E.2d 29, 30; State v. McNichols, 63 Idaho 100, 117 P.2d 468,
469-470; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229.
195 P.2d 1017, 1020; see, also, Fairmount
Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa.
Super. 367,5 A.2d 419, 42(}.421; Krug
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.
Super. 22, 65 A.2d 542, 544.

[7] Equally applicable here as in the
Asher case is the fundamental legal principle of the Dorrell decision in precluding
plaintiffs, "admitting the violation of the

law," which they must disclose as ff 'the
groundwork of [their] claim''', from recovery of the money which was in actual
use in their illegal gambling activities.
Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585, 4
P.2d 712, 714. It is not a question of the
ultimate disposition of the seized money,
but rather application of a "salutary rule
invoked to uphold law and order." Asher
v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.App.2d 403, 414,
79 P.2d 462. This principle of the law,
grounded on public POliCY, is not affected
by the independent considerations entering
into the statutory declaration limiting forfeitures to those "expressly imposed by
law". (Pen. Code, § 2604.) As pointed out
in the Dorrell ca'se, 4 P.2d 713, in an action
for conversion, the "plaintiff must recover,
if at all, upon the strength of his own title
and not upon the weakness of his adversary
'" • •. n (See, also, 22 Ca1.Jur. § 42.
p. 167.) Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not undertake to declare a
forfeiture hut properly held that plaintiffs
were not entitled to prevail in their suit
for recovery of the seized gambling funds.
See Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585,
4 P.2d 712, 714.
In view of the conclusion reached on
the question heretofore discussed, it is
unnecessary to determine whether plaintiffs would be barred in any event because
of their failure to present a claim in the
manner provided in section 29704 of the
Government Code (formerly Pol. Code, §
4075).
The judgment is affirmed.

GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK and EDMONDS, JJ., concurred.
CARTER, Justice.
I dissent,
The majority opinion holds, contrary to
the statutes, that a person convicted of
gambling (Pen. Code. § 330) may be .ubj ected to two penalties, fine or imprisonment and the loss of the money that was
used in the gambling enterprise and selLed
by the arresting officers. It arrives at that
astonishing conclusion by equally astonishing reasoning. It concedes that the state
could no/ dccla1'e a forfeiture of the me....
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ey-that it is oot ~contraband. Yet It con- ery of the money seized, puts itself above
eludes that if the state does seize it and
is unlawfuUy holding it, the Owners cannot recover it. If the result of that CODelusion is not confiscation or forfeiture,

the law and "works" a forfeiture.

This

i

section has been ·applied as not defeating
an action to protect a homestead on pro~
erty used for prostitution. In Harlan v.

then the law is indeed an "ass," for it for- Schulze, 7 Cal.App. 287, 294-295, 94 P.
sakes logic and reason for sophistry-a 379, 382, the court stated: -"If residing
mere play on words resulting in a legal in a house of prostitution is a crime, as·
paradox-the -state cannot acquire title- suggested by respondent in view of secthe owner cannot recover possession from tion 315 of the Penal Code, we must not

the state.
The majority announces the broad rule
that where any property is used in the
commission of any unlawful act and the

overlook section 677 [the predecessor of
§ 2604] of the same Code, which declares:
'No conviction of any person for crime
works any forfeiture of any property, ex-

officers seize it while making an arrest cept in cases in which a forfeiture is ex-

(I assume it was lawfully seized and cauld pressly imposed by law; and all forfeitures
be held a. evidence for the trial), then the to the people of this state, in the nature
state may retain it although it cannot de- of a'deodand, or where any person shall
clare it forfeited.

The implications of flee from justice, are abolished!"

In

that rule are far reaching and inimical to Chapman v. Aggeler, 47 Cal,App.2d 848,
our concept of justice. It may even go 119 P.2d 204, the owner of slot machines
so far that an! time a traffic officer has the seized by the police ina raid, brought an
notion, he may seize a car which he claims action to recover them. Losing in' the
is being used in violation of any of the. trial court, the owner appealed. The apinnumerable traffic laws. A pernnent iI- pellate court reversed and directed the trial
lustration is suggested by what is done court to order return of the machines. The
under the ordinances which authorize the court proceeded in part on the ground that

towing away o.f cars when parked in prohibited areas. If the city should decide
that it would like to use those cars for
carrying on its business, it may do so, Ac-

there was no dinding that the machines
were used for gambling, but .u.o, said
47 CaI.App.Zd at pages 860-&51, 119 P.2d

at page 210: "We first call attention to
cording to the majority opinion they could the fact that this appellant was convicted
not be confiscated but the owners could of no crime, and then cite the restrictive
not recover them from the city. The same rule which obtains even when a defendant
would be true of a horse run in an illegal is found guilty. It is found in section 677

race.
of the Penal Code providing that 'No conThe statutes in this state leave no room viction of any person for crime works any .
forfeiture of any property, except in cases
for doubt that property used in the commission of an unlawful act cannot be con- in _,which a forfeiture is expressly imposed
discated by the state unless the statute by I~w', In all of chapter X of the Penal
e",pressly so provides. It .is conceded by ~ Code, \\,:hich is entitled 'Gaming', and where
the majority that there is no statute au- .ection!~30a appears, there was, prior to
thorizing or permitting the forfeiture of this lear, no provision for forfeitur~ This
money used in a gambling 'fame. The can hardly be considered accidental since
Penal Code provides: "No conviction of the p'receding chapter dealing with lotterie.
any person for a crime works any forfeiture of any properly, except in cases in
which a forfeiture i. e",pressly imposed by
(Pen. Code, § 2604.)
law; * •

cont.in$ '8 provision for forfeiture in sec..
tion -325,' an instance where forfeiture is

'expressly imposed by law'. But even
there, in order to make forfeiture effec(Italics added.) A conviction of gambling tive, an action must be brought or an incannot, therefore, "work" a forfeiture; formation filed 'by the attorney-general, or
that is, the law cannot "work" a forfeiture. by any district attorney, in the name of
But this court, by refusing to allow recov- the state'. And by this procedure no

_.n

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I!filll-~~2~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _• __-~,iiOI;,E>N.,~"
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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lottery or gambling machine may be taken
by the state, but only the cmoneys and
property, oftered for sale or distribution
* * *'. * • * In short, there is no
statute in California that has been called to
our attention or that we have been able to
'find that vests in the court authority to
declare a forfeiture in a case such as we
afe considering. In the absence of express
statutory authority, the order requiring the
destruction of the property in question_ is
without legal sanction and void.
"It follows from this that the portion of
the judgment, by which the court ordered
the seized property to be destroyed and arecord entry made of its destruction, can·
not be sustained.
"Judgment reversed, without costs to
either party, and the cause remanded with

instructions that judgment be entered for
plaintiff entitling him to tlte return, forthwith of the seized property." (Italics
added.) That case stands, therefore, for
the proposition that if property, seized
while being used unlawfully, may not be
confiscated by the state, the owner may
recover it.
Furthermore, it should be observed that
the Legislature has provided that the
maximum penalty for the violation of section 330 of the Penal Code, of which plaintiffs were convicted, is a $500 fine. (Pen.
Code, § -330.) Yet this court, by refusing
to allow recovery of the money, levies a
,fine of over $6,000.
It has been held that the owner may
recover money when it is used in gaming
and seized by the state where there is no
statute providing for a forfeiture. Chappen v. Stapleton, 58 Ga.App. 138, 198 S.E.
109; Kearney v. Webb, 278 Ill. 17, 115
N.E. 844, 3 A.L.R. 1631; 23 Minn.L.Rev.
976. Schur v. Johnson, 2 Ca1.App.2d
680, 38 P.2d 844 and Asher v. Johnson, 26
Ca1.App.2d 403, 79 P.2d 457, relied upon
by the majority are not in point, for they
did not involve or consider the lack of
right in the state to declare a forfeiture
unless expressly authorized by statute.
(Pen. Code, § 2604, supra.) Moreover
those cases ignored the rule, later discussed, that a stranger to the gambling

game-the state here-cannot rely upon
the illegality of the use being made of the
money.
The majority opinion rests its conclusion
in part upon the proposition that a third
party, the state here, may raise the claim
of the illegality of the transaction between
the participants in the game and cite Schur
v. Johnson, supra, and Asher v. Johnson,
supra. That is not the law in California
or elsewhere. For illustration, it is said
in Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Ca1.2d 436, 440, 106
P.2d 620, 622: "For example, a bank will
not be permitted to invoke the illegality of
a contract between two individuals and
thereby retain money which was the fruit
of the illegal transaction and which was
deposited by one of them for the account
of the other." (See cases collected SO
A.L.R. 293.) Here, the state was not a
party to the unlawful game and it can
make no claim to the money through the
participants. It is in no different position
than a thief who seized the money from
the table, and, as said in 29 California
Law Review 422, in commenting on the
Schur and Asher cases, supra: "It is difficult to see how the state's wrongful collection of taxes can in any way be said
to make the state claim through the tango
proprietors. The state would be just as
much a stranger to the illegal business as
would a thief, or as was the bank in the
case put by the court, supra, note 18. The
court's refusal to aid the parties to recOver
their money seems to be no more than a
judicially created and imvosed pena1ty for
carrying on the unlawful business." A'E
we have seen, the Legislature has ,fixed the
penalty for gambling, and stated that there
could be no forfeiture. This court, theTefore, has no authority to increase it or
impose a forfeiture. To do so is to usurp
the power of the Legislature in viDlation
of the Constitution (art. III, § 1).
Closely related to the last discusseu
proposition is the majority's conclusion
that plaintiffs could not recover if they
had to rely upon the illegal gambling transaction to prevail. ,It is conceded that if
they do not so have to place their reliance
on such transaction they may prevail, and
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that is the law. Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Cal.2d it follows that the state may and will ap402, 410, 202 P.2d 10, 7 AL.R2d 922. All propriate it to its own use with impunity
they would need to ~show -is that it was and a forfeiture is effected in violation of
their money that was .00 the table and the the express statutory provision to the consheriff seized it and that he or one of the trary-another legal paradox.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
defendants stilI retains it. For what purpose the money was t~e.re or what use was
being made of it would be wholly imSCHAUER, Justice (dissenting).
I concur ,in the conclusion reached by
material. It is no different than the illustration given in K)'lie Y. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d Justice Carter. This is not a case in
436, 440, 106 P.2d 620, supra, of the bank which relief tenably can be denied upon
hOlding funds involvecf ~in an illegal trans- the ground that title is daimed through
action in which it ~~ ~ot: a participant.
an iJIegal transaction. The claimants' title
The majority opinion speaks of public here does not appear to have been derived
policy as the basis for its conclusion. The. from gaming; -c on the contrary, it ',is asquestion arises: Who -is supreme in that serted and proved .to exist entirely indefield, the Legislature ·or the courts? The pendent of the gaining. .
Legislature, by faiIi1>g to provide for a
The action of this court does not strike
forfeiture, and furth~r ,stating, that when down but, rather, puts a premium on lawit does not so provide, there shall be none lessness. It accomplishes that which could
(Pen. Code, § 2604, supra), has unequivo- properly be ordained, if at all, only on a
cally announced the:. policy that persons forfeiture statute clear and unmistakable
engaged ingambling shall not be penalized in terms. There is no· such statute; the
by losing the money, used.; The majority decisioD,'therefore, invades the province of
opinion tluUifies this Policy; for it will not the Legislature.
permit the owners of "the mpney to recover
The mischievo~s r~sult$ whiCh may fot~
it. To say that that does not _amount to a low are legion. Among other thin~ it
forfeiture is to deny ~the obvi'ous. It can- purports .to give judicial protection to hi~
not be denied that by ~uch a holding the jacking. Anyone may appropriate any obowners lose their property. The state has ject used directly or indirectly in an unlawit and intends to keep" it. It cannot obtain £ul activity., A. hostess entertaining at
title to it .by forfeit.u~. prQceedings, but no bridge or gin rummy or simila.r diversion
doubt it will eventuaH), make use of it. may well find her furniture (card tables,
It cannot be left in
It was said by chairs, etc.) appropriated and removed from
Judge.Augustus N. Hand, that recovery of her premises; she cannot recover them. A
property involved in r~ illegal transaction player may find his eyeglasses taken from·
will nol be barred "w~e~~ the res sought to him; he cannot recover them. It could not
be recovered is held ill ~scrow under what be burglary to unvitedly arid 'Surrel?titiously
is in effect an order of interpleader so that enter a private home for the purpose of
a refusal to act in favor of the complainant appropriating such abjects.
will amount to affirmative action in favor
All of this is enacted by this court to no
of the other party." I Judson v. Buckley;
worthy end. The holding ·will not have
Z Cir., 130 F.2d 174, 180.. That. is precisely
the slightest deterrent effect on organized
the situation here. (rhe state does not
or professional gambling; it can be used
have title and cannot" have it declared
forfeited.. It thus has mere possession, to embarrass and injure inoffensive and
substantial citizens in their homes.
such as in escrow, aftd'to. deny recovery
bY the owners amounts :to an Uaffinnative The judgment should be reversed.
action in favor" of the 'state, that is, for...
TRAYNOR, Justice (dissenting).
feiture. No one can prevent the state from
using it a.s the otlly ..,tereslea parlies are
I concur in the conclusion reached by
the O'WtIers and they can do nothing. Hence Justices CARTER and SCHAUER

IilnqQ.

